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NOTES
COSELMAN v. SCHLEIFER:
THE MARK OF PEDRICK
INTRODUCTION

Beyond question, the meaning and operation of the concept
of "contributory negligence as a matter of law" has changed
radically in the very recent past in Illinois. Four short years
ago the Illinois Supreme Court could say:
But it is also the law that when all the evidence is considered in its
aspect most favorable to the other party, together with all reasonable inferences, and it appears therefrom that there is no evidence
from which [contributory] negligence could reasonably be inferred,
it is the trial court's duty to direct a verdict accordingly.,
This is a very restrictive test. But, in the recent case of
Coselman v. Schleifer,2 the Second District Appellate Court held
both contributory negligence and assumption of risk to have been
properly ruled as a matter of law in the trial court. The genesis
of the test tacitly applied by the Coselman court was the case
of Pedrick v. Peoria& Eastern Railroad Co.,3 where the Illinois
Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed the question of when
the direction of a verdict, entry of a judgment n.o.v., or making
of a ruling as a matter of law was proper. The Pedrick court
stated the test as follows:
[V]erdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only
in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its
aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors
movant
that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever
4
stand.

The Pedrick5 court made it clear that the test for direction
of a verdict is identical to the test for determining when negligence or contributory negligence is a question of law. The court
cogently stated:
Logic demands that one rule govern both the direction of verdicts
and the determination of the presence or absence of negligence or
contributory negligence as a matter of law, for in both situations
the issue is whether a court or the jury should decide the negligence
issue. 6

Coselman is one of what looms to be a legion of cases in the
post-Pedrick era in which the courts will realistically deal with
' Smith v. Bishop, 32 fI1. 2d 380, 383-84, 205 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1965).
297 Ill. App. 2d 123, 239 N.E.2d 687 (1968).
3 37 Il. 2d. 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).

4Id. at 510, 229 N.E.2d at 513-14.
5 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
6 Id. at 503, 229 N.E.2d at 510.
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the problem of direction of verdicts and rulings on negligence and
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The underlying
rationale of directed verdicts, rulings as a matter of law, and
judgments n.o.v., is whether there is any factual issue for a jury
to decide; if there is not, the court must decide the question as
a matter of law.
Coselman v. Schleifer
In Coselman, a domestic employee sued to recover for injuries sustained while doing housework for her employer. The
seventy-two year old cleaning woman caught her foot on a rubber-backed rug lying on a landing at the top of a steep, narrow
and poorly lighted stairwell leading to the defendant's basement,
and fell to the basement floor, striking her head and suffering
severe injuries. The plaintiff had never complained about
the stairs or the landing. There was evidence that the woman
had suffered from hypertension and was subject to dizziness.
The Second District Appellate Court, for purposes of the appeal,
assumed that the plaintiff did not become dizzy and fall, but
tripped on the rug in question. 7 There was also a finding of fact
that the light was sufficient for the plaintiff to see various objects laying on the stairs.
In considering the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
entered by the trial court, the appellate court held that: (1) under the facts, contributory negligence was properly ruled as a
matter of law; (2) under the facts, assumption of risk was properly ruled as a matter of law; (3) contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are separate and distinct concepts in Illinois
law; and (4) an employee assumes all ordinary risks and extraordinary ones of which he knows, or ought to know, and the
dangers which he appreciates or ought to appreciate, and of
which he makes no complaint.9
Before turning to the contributory negligence question, it
should be noted that in its discussion of these other issues the
court appeared to be imbued with the philosophy of Pedrick.1 °
That is, in holding contributory negligence and assumption of
risk to be separate and distinct concepts and ruling assumption
of risk as a matter of law, the Coselman court extended the role
of the court into another area which has generally been one for
the jury." An analysis of the treatment of these two concepts
in Coselman will evidence an attitude toward rulings as a matter
7

97 Il. App. 2d 123, 126, 239 N.E.2d 687, 688 (1968).

at 127-28, 239 N.E.2d at 689.
9 Id. at 126-27, 239 N.E.2d at 689-90.
10 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
11 Kelly v. Fletcher-Merna Co-op. Grain Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 426,
173 N.E.2d 855, 859 (1961).
8 Id.
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of law that is directly in line with the tenor of the Pedrick test.'
In holding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk in the
employment, the Coselman court was not bound to any such
dramatic precedent as Pedrick. The court tacitly laid down a
test for ruling assumption of risk as a matter of law that has
been laid down in virtually all of the Illinois cases on this
subject. 13 As the Third District Appellate Court said in Stone
v. Guthrie14 in holding the question of the plaintiff's assumption
of risk to be one for the jury:
The question of assumed risk is usually and normally one for the
jury and involves a subsidiary question of whether the servant
understood and appreciated the risks which he is alleged to have
assumed.' 5
The step taken by the Coselman court that is uncommon in
most Illinois cases on this subject is the inference of the court
that it is proper for a court to make a judgment as to the plaintiff's mental state, that is, as to whether the plaintiff appreciated
the dangers involved in the situation. One such case not willing
to make this inference is Maytnier v. Rush. 6 In Maytnier, a
patron at a major league baseball game was hit by a ball thrown
wildly from the bullpen. In stating that the question of the
plaintiff's assumption of risk would have been one for the jury,
the court said:
[T]he doctrine's [assumption of risk's] underlying premise is appreciation of the danger itself, not mere knowledge of a defect or
condition by which danger is created,
thereby necessarily raising
17
a question of fact for the jury.
However, other courts, like the Coselman court, find no difficulty in making the determination of the plaintiff's mental state
as a matter of law. In Kelly v. Fletcher-Merna Co-operative
Grain Co., 18 an experienced farm worker was injured when his
foot slipped into a nearby auger as he was attempting to load
corn. The Kelly court said:
12 See text at note 4 supra.

I8 See Maytnier v. Rush, 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1967);
Kelly v. Fletcher-Merna Co-op. Grain Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 173 N.E.2d
855 (1961); Stone v. Guthrie, 14 Ill. App. 2d 137, 144 N.E.2d 165 (1957);

Stahl v. Dow, 332 Ill. App. 233, 74 N.E.2d 907 (1947) ; Huff v. Illinois Cent.

R.R., 279 Ill. App. 323, aff'd, 362 Ill. 95, 199 N.E. 116 (1935); Wehrhahn
v. Stern Ullman Co., 178 Ill. App. 363 (1913).
'4 14 Ill. App. 2d 137, 144 N.E.2d 165 (1957), where the plaintiff was
injured while loading a silo, getting his leg caught in an auger.
15 Id. at 150, 144 N.E.2d at 171. Accord, Hinrichs v. Gummow, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 428, 190 N.E.2d 610 (1963).
16 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1967).
17 Id. at 351, 225 N.E.2d at 91. Accord, Preble v. Wabash R.R., 243
Ill. 340, 90 N.E. 716 (1909) ; Fox v. Beall, 314 Ill. App. 144, 41 N.E.2d 126
(1942) ; Collins v. Kurth, 247 Ill. App. 156 (1925) ; Levi v. Illinois Box Co.,
161 Ill. App. 157 (1911); Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 137 Ill. App. 110
(1907); Linderman Box & Veneer Co. v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 134
(1906) ; Frink v. Potts, 105 Ill. App. 92 (1902).
18 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 173 N.E.2d 855 (1961).
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'It is true. . .. that the questions of whether appellant assumed
the danger or not ... are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury
to pass upon, yet where, as here, there is no conflict in the evidence
it is the duty of the trial court to apply well-recognized principles of
law to the uncontradicted evidence and when that is done the only
reasonable conclusion that can be arrived at from all the facts appearing in the record is that the appellant assumed the hazard...
knowingly exposed himself to that known danger and this precludes any recovery. ' 9
In Wehrhahn v. Stern Ullman Co., 20 the trial court's directed
verdict for the defendant was upheld on appeal, the First District

Appellate Court ruling that by frequently using the stairs upon
which he was injured, the plaintiff must have known of their condition and assumed the risk connected with their use.2

In short, though there was authority for the position of the
Coselman court in holding the risk to have been assumed by the

plaintiff as it did, the approach in Coselman was an expansive
one, favoring rulings as a matter of law.

In distinguishing contributory negligence from assumption
of risk, the Coselman court followed the weight of Illinois case
law on the subject. 22 In Kelly v. Fletcher-Merna Co-operative
Grain Co.,2 3 the court said:
'Contributory negligence and assumption of risk are entirely
different things in the law. Although the two questions may arise
under the facts of a case, yet they are wholly separate and distinct.
Every person suing for a personal injury must show that he was
in the exercise of ordinary care and caution for his own safety so
that the question of contributory negligence may be involved in
every case; but an employee may have assumed a risk by virtue of
his employment or by continuing in such employment with knowledge of the defect and danger and if he is injured thereby, aland caution,
though in the exercise of the highest degree of care
24
and without any negligence, yet he cannot recover.'
In Illinois, contributory negligence has been operationally
defined as follows: "Every person suing for a personal injury
must show that he was in the exercise of ordinary care and cau."
On the other hand, assumption
tion for his own safety ...
of risk has been likewise functionally defined in the following
19 Id. at 426, 173 N.E.2d at 859, quoting from Stahl v. Dow, 332 Ill. App.
233, 74 N.E.2d 907 (1947).
20 178 Ill.
App. 363 (1913).
21

Id. at 366.

See Wheeler v. Chicago & W.I.R.R., 267 Ill. 306, 108 N.E. 330 (1915);
Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Heerey, 203 Ill. 492, 68 N.E. 74 (1903); Kelly v.
Fletcher-Merna Co-op. Grain Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 173 N.E.2d 855 (1961);
Minters v. Mid-City Mgt. Corp., 331 Ill. App. 64, 72 N.E.2d 729 (1947).
2329 Ill. App. 2d 419, 173-N.E2d-855-(-1961), quoting from-Stahl v.
Dow, 332 Ill. App. 233, 74 N.E.2d 907 (1947).
Accord, Chicago & E.I.R.R. v.
24 Id. at 425-26, 173 N.E.2d at 858-59.
Heerey, 203 Ill. 492, 68 N.E. 74 (1903), where the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the jury instructions did not sufficiently distinguish contributory negligence from assumption of risk.
25 Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Heerey, 203 Ill.
492, 502, 68 N.E. 74, 77
(190).
22
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terms: " . .. [A]n employee may have assumed a risk by virtue
of his employment, or by continuing in such employment with
knowledge of the defect and danger ...
.1-2
To the same effect
is Minters v. Mid-City Management Corp.,27 where the court held

that contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault
or breach of duty on the part of the employee, whereas assumption of risk may be free from any suggestion of fault or negligence on the part of the employee.2 8 Similarly, in Wheeler v.
Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co.,2 9 the court said that
though the question of contributory negligence may be involved
in every action for personal injury, contributory negligence, as

distinguished from assumption of risk, is the failure of an employee to use those precautions for his own safety that reasonable
prudence requires. 30
There is not, however, complete uniformity as to this conceptual separation of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The Fourth District Appellate Court, in Hargis v. Stan-

dard Oil Co.,, 1 an action for injuries sustained by the plaintiff
while delivering oil products to the defendant, rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had assumed the risk by
attempting to make the delivery with inadequate light, saying:
Plainly, the courts frequently treat the question of voluntary
exposure to a visible risk as bearing upon the defense of contributory negligence. While we do not hold that the doctrine of assumed
risk is limited to master-servant cases, we do hold that in the
instant case it is merely a reargument of the question whether
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; that the conduct of
plaintiff in proceeding with his work by the aid of a hand lantern,
knowing the yard light was out, was properly submitted to the jury
as a question of due care . . .3
2GId. at 502, 68 N.E. at 77.
27331 Ill. A pp. 64,72 N.E.2d 729 (1947).
28
Id. at 78, 72 N.E.2d at 734.

29 267 Ill. 806, 108 N.E. 330 (1915).

80 Id. at 319-20, 108 N.E. at 336.
81 10 Ill. App. 2d 119 134 N.E.2d 518 (1956).
32Id. at 124, 134 N.E.2d at 521.
Another problem with regard to the distinction between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk turns on the question of whether the
doctrine of assumption of risk is applicable only to cases arising between
master and servant. In Conrad v. Springfield Consol. Ry., 240 Ill. 12, 88
N.E. 180 (1909), the court said: "Appellant's contention that appellee must
be held, as a matter of law, to have assumed the risk, cannot be sustained,
since the doctrine of assumption of risk is only applicable to cases arising
between master and servant." Id. at 17 88 N.E. at 182. Similarly in
Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N.E. 354 (1905), the court said:
There was, therefore, no contractual relation existing between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and as the doctrine of assumed risk rests
upon and grows out of the contractual relation which exists between
master and servant, the question of assumed risk is not involved in this
case, and defendant cannot be relieved of liability on the ground plaintiff assumed the risk which caused his injury.
Id. at 246, 76 N.E. at 356.
Other cases have limited the doctrine to situations in which there is at
least some contractual relationship. In Reed v. Zellers, 273 Ill. App. 18
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Clearly, the separation of the two doctrines is consistent
with the trend toward more frequent rulings as a matter of law.
This separation makes possible such rulings in cases involving

both assumption of risk and contributory negligence where there
are present the elements necessary for ruling only one or the
other as a matter of law.
However important these other questions are in Coselman,
undoubtedly the most significant point which Coselman demon-

strates is the clearly apparent ease with which the court found
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Here the great latitude of the Pedrick test 33 becomes compellingly apparent. In ruling that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, the court relied principally on two factors. First, "[t]he
plaintiff knew of the condition of the landing and stairs. ' ' 3 4 Secondly, "[b]y her own testimony, it is clear that she could or
should have seen the rug had she been attentive. ' 35 In holding as

it did, the Coselman court took a position contrary to the weight
of the Illinois cases in similar factual situations. Suits by plaintiffs who had fallen on stairs had in the past virtually universally

been held to be questions for the jury on the issue of whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent.36
(1933), in holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk did not apply in
an action by an automobile guest passenger, the court said: "The doctrine
of assumed risk applies only where there is a contractual relation between
the parties." Id. at 24.
In Baker v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 161 Ill. App. 521 (1911), the court held
that the defendant, a railroad, could not use the defense of assumption of
risk because the plaintiff was an employee of another railroad.
However, in other cases, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been
held to exist where any voluntarily assumed relationship exists whether or
not contractual. In Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225,
14 N.E.2d 879 (1938), the court, quoting Bohlen, Studies in the Law of
Torts 20 HARV. L. REv. 14, 91 (1906), said:
[Nieither the maxim, volenti non fitinjuria, as expressing the principle
that one who has voluntarily encountered a known danger cannot recover from the creator thereof, nor the principle itself, is confined to
cases of workmen against their employers, and "is not in any way
founded upon anything peculiar to the relation of master and servant,
nor based upon the contractual nature of the relation."
295 Ill. App. 225, 238, 14 N.E.2d 879, 884 (1938).
3 See text at note 4 supra.
3497 Ill. App. 2d 123, 129, 239 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1968).
35

Id.

Some of the "stair and incline" cases in the past have been:
Holsman v. Darling State St. Corp., 6 Ill. App. 2d 517, 128 N.E.2d 581
(1955), where the plaintiff slipped while attempting to go down stairs and
the court ruled the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence to be
one for the jury; Peterson v. Hendrickson, 335 Ill. App. 223, 81 N.E.2d 266
(1948), where the plaintiff fell down tavern basement stairs behind a small
door in a telephone room and the Second District Appellate Court ruled the
question to be one for the jury; Savaiano v. The 12th St. Store, 330 Ill.
App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 744 (1947), in which a customer fell on the stairs of a
business establishment and the question was one for the jury; and Lubin
v. Goldblatt Bros., 37 Ill. App. 2d 437, 186 N.E.2d 64 (1962), a customer,
leaving a store, slipped and fell on a recently waxed floor containing a slight
slope, and in ruling the contributory negligence question to be one of fact,
the First District Appellate Court said: "No precise law can be laid down
36
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PRE-PEDRICK TESTS IN ILLINOIS

Before the decision in the Pedrick case, the Illinois authority
on the ruling of contributory negligence as a matter of law could
be divided into three broad and somewhat overlapping categories.
The first test stated that whenever there was any evidence whatsoever tending to show due care on the part of the plaintiff, the
question was one for the jury. 37 The second and most common test
was that in order for the plaintiff to be ruled contributorily negligent as a matter of law, all reasonable minds must agree that
such was the case. 38 Third, there was, even from the early
cases, a line of decisions less restrictive than the first two tests
in ruling contributory negligence as a matter of law. The test
was that the court must be able to clearly see that the plaintiff
9
was contributorily negligent.3
No Evidence Test
A statement of perhaps the most restrictive test to determine if the question of contributory negligence should be ruled
as a matter of law was made by the First District Appellate Court
in Prill v. City of Chicago,40 where the plaintiff's intestate fell
into an excavation in the street and the court held him guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law:
While ordinarily the question of contributory negligence is one
of fact for a jury to determine, where as here, there is no evidence
in the record that Prill exercised any care for his own safety immediately prior to and at the time of the injury, it becomes a
question of law.41
In Okai v. United Roofing & Siding Co.,42 where the plaintiff's intestate was killed while attempting to put out a fire allegedly caused by the defendant's employee, the court, in holding
the contributory negligence question to be one for the jury, said:
The question of due care is a question of fact to be submitted to the
on the subject, but each case must be determined on its own facts." Id. at
444-45, 186 N.E.2d at 68.
Until Ped-ick, contributory negligence had been ruled as a matter of
law only in extreme circumstances. In Durkin v. Marshall Field & Co., 161
Ill. App. 505 (1911), the First District Appellate Court indicated that the
plaintiff might have been contributorily negligent in attempting to go down
stairs while intoxicated and carrying a wheelbarrow on his shoulders, though
the case was reversed on a finding of no negligence on the defendant's part.
Also, in Blumberg v. Baird, 319 Ill.
App. 642, 49 N.E.2d 745 (1943), the
First District Appellate Court indicated that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent for using stairs which were clearly icy and slippery. However, the
decision also turned upon the fact that a continuous snowfall had made it
practically impossible for the defendant to keep the stairs clear.
See J. O'MEARA, TORT LIABILITY OF ILLINOIS LAND OCCUPIERS (1968).
37 See text at note 41 infra.
38 See text at note 50 infra.
39 See text at note 54 infra.
40 317 Ill. App. 202, 46 N.E.2d 119 (1942).
41 Id. at 214, 46 N.E.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
42 24 Ill. App. 2d 243, 164 N.E.2d 237 (1960).
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jury when there i$ any evidence which with legitimate inferences
that may be reasonably drawn therefrom tends to show the exercise
43
of due care.

An important corollary of the "no evidence" test is that
there be no reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence in the plaintiff's favor. In Blumb v. Betz," a surviving
wife brought a wrongful death action against the defendant who
ran over her husband as he was walking on a highway. The
court said:
[I]n considering such a motion [by the defendant for a directed
verdict] the trial court should consider the evidence produced on the
part of the plaintiff most strongly in the plaintiff's favor and give
it every reasonable intendment favorable to plaintiff. 45

One of the more comprehensive statements of the "no evidence" rule is found in the case of Thomas v. Buchanan,46 a case
in which the plaintiff's intestate was riding in an automobile and
died as a result of a collision with another car. In holding the
question of the plaintiff's intestate's contributory negligence to be
a jury question, the court said:
The question of due care . . . is always a question of fact to be
submitted to a jury whenever there is any evidence in the record
which, with any legitimate inferences that may be reasonably and
legally drawn therefrom, tends to show the exercise of due care
47
on the part of the deceased.

The "no evidence" test stresses the fact that there be no evidence
in the plaintiff's favor showing his due care; nor can there be any
inference in his favor.
43 Id. at 246-47, 164 N.E.2d at 239. Accord, Geraghty v. Burr Oak
Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill. 2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47 (1955), and Bracher v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 5 Ill. App. 2d 375, 125 N.E.2d 687 (1955). In Ge'aghty, the
plaintiff caught his foot on poles used to keep cars in line in an unlighted
parking lot. The court, in ruling the question of contributory negligence
to be one for the jury said:
[Alll controverted questions of fact, in a jury trial, must be submitted
to the jury for decision. This is primarily the exclusive function of
the jury, and to withdraw such questions from its consideration is to
usurp its function.
5 Ill. 2d 153, 164, 125 N.E.2d 47, 53 (1955).
Similarly, in Bracher, the
court said: " . . . questions of contributory negligence where the facts
were in dispute, are questions of fact for the jury to determine." 5 Ill.
App. 2d 375, 379, 125 N.E.2d 687, 689 (1955).
44 366 Ill. 273, 8 N.E.2d 620 (1937).
i5id. at 274, 8 N.E.2d at 621. Accord, Carter v. Winter, 50 Ill. App. 2d
467, 200 N.E.2d 528 (1964), aff'd, 32 Ill. 2d 275, 204 N.E.2d 755 (1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965), where the plaintiff entered the highway
with another car approaching. The court said that the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was for the jury:
Even where the facts are admitted or undisputed, but where a difference
of opinion as to the inference that may legitimately be drawn from
them exists, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence
ought to be submitted to the jury - it is primarily for the jury to
draw the inference.
Id. at 477, 200 N.E.2d at 533.
4" 357 Ill. 270, 192 N.E. 215 (1934).
47 Id. at 278, 192 N.E. at 218 (emphasis added).
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All Reasonable Minds Must Agree Test
The second and most common of the Illinois tests is the "all

reasonable minds must agree" test. This test is not as restrictive
as to the granting of rulings as a matter of law as the "no evidence" test.4 8 The "all reasonable minds must agree" test allows

some evidence to be in the plaintiff's favor and still contributory
negligence may be ruled against the plaintiff as a matter of law.
The amount of evidence in the plaintiff's favor must certainly
be very small, as the court in Swenson v. City of Rockford49 indicated. There, the plaintiff walked over a defective sidewalk
with knowledge of its unsafe condition. In holding the plaintiff's

contributory negligence to be a jury question, the court said:
It [contributory negligence] becomes a question of law only when
the evidence is so clearly insufficient to establish due care that
all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion that there was
contributory negligence.50

The test was reiterated in Sterba v. First Federal Savings

and Loan51 where the plaintiff walked into and struck her head
on the wooden awning attached to a parking lot attendant's shelter. The court, in holding the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence to be a jury question, said:
The question of contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and becomes a question of law only when
all reasonable minds 52would reach a conclusion that there was contributory negligence.

Court Can Clearly See Test

The most liberal test in granting rulings as a matter of law
demands neither that there be no evidence in the plaintiff's favor
48 See text at note 41 supra.
499 Ill. 2d 122, 136 N.E.2d 777 (1956).
5o1d. at 128, 136 N.E.2d at 780. Accord, Ziraldo v. W.I. Lynch Co.,
365 Ill. 197, 6 N.E.2d 125 (1936). In that case the plaintiff, who was leaning into an elevator shaft was struck and thrown down the adjacent shaft
by a descending elevator. The court, using the language later adopted by
the Swenson court held the contributory negligence issue to be a jury question.
5177 Ill. App. 2d 380, 222 N.E.2d 547 (1966).
52 Id. at 385, 222 N.E.2d at 549. Accord, Ames v. Armour Co., 246
Ill. App. 118 (1927); Petro v. Hines, 299 Ill. 236, 132 N.E. 462 (1921).
In the Ames case, the plaintiff was injured when a train and the defendant's
truck collided. The court said:
Whether the plaintiff, at and just prior to the time of the collision,
was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, we think considering the complicated situation of facts, shown by the evidence,
some of which tends to show care and some almost foolhardiness, and
concerning which reasonable men might differ in their judgment was a question of fact for the jury. And the jury having found in favor of the plaintiff, the question arises, was their finding clearly against
the weight of the evidence?
Ames v. Armour Co., supra at 124. In Petro, where the deceased was hit and
killed by a train at a crossing where the warning signals had been operating, the court said, "all reasonable minds must agree." Petro v. Hines,
supra at 240, 132 N.E. at 464.
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nor that all reasonable minds agree that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The test was stated in Ames v. Terminal
Railroad Association,53 where the plaintiff's intestate was a passenger in the car of another and was killed instantly by a train
at a railroad crossing. In holding the plaintiff's intestate contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the court said:
EW] hen there is no conflict in the evidence and the court can clearly
see that the injury was the result of the negligence of the party
injured, it should not hesitate
to instruct the jury to return a ver5
dict for the defendant. 4
An equally compelling version of this rule was stated in Beidler
v. Branshaw" where the plaintiff was injured in an elevator in
the defendant's building when he caught his foot between the
elevator and the elevator shaft. In holding the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, this court clearly
eliminated the requirement that there be no evidence in the plaintiff's favor. The court said:
• .."While questions of negligence or of contributory negligence
are ordinarily questions of fact, to be passed upon by a.jury, yet
when the undisputed evidence is so conclusive that the court would
be compelled to set aside a verdict in opposition to it, the court may
withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury and direct a
verdict."56
In another conceptual restatement of this test, the First District Appellate Court in 1946 presaged the Pedrick test5 7 in Zoloth
v. Walker-Wabash Corp., In that case, the plaintiff was injured
by falling over the edge of the wooden ramp used by the defendant in the operation of a parking lot business, as he stepped out
of the automobile in which he was riding as a guest. The windows of the automobile in which the plaintiff was a guest were
steamed up. The defendant's attendant did nothing to caution
the plaintiff of any danger. The appellate court, in holding the
question to be one for the jury, laid down an expansive rule for
determining when the question should be one of law. The test
is distinctly a forerunner of Pedrick as the question is placed
entirely within the discretion of the trial court:
"[C]ases occasionally arise in which a person is so careless
53 332 Ill. App. 187, 75 N.E.2d 42 (1947).
4 Id. at 193-94, 75 N.E.2d at 45. Accord, Pope v. Illinois Terminal
R.R., 329 Ill. App. 62, 67 N.E.2d 284 (1946); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Oswald, 338 11. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930). Both cases, using the identical
wording of the Ames case, held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a

matter of law.

55200 Ill. 425, 65 N.E. 1086 (1902).
Id. at 431, 65 N.E. at 1088, quoting from Werk v. Illinois Steel Co.,
154 Ill.
427, 40 N.E. 442 (1895). Accord, Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 210
Ill.
603, 71 N.E. 398 (1904), where the court in applying the Beidler test
found the plaintiff, a railroad employee run over in the railroad yard by a
56

locomotive, guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
5 See text at note 4 supra.
5S 328 Ill. App. 564, 66 N.E.2d 443 (1946).
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or his conduct so violative of all rational standards of conduct applicable to persons in a like situation that the court can say, as a
matter of law, that no rational person would have acted as he did
and render judgment for the defendant."M
THE EFFECT OF PEDRICK

The 1967 case of Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railroad
Co.60 has become the leading case in the area of ruling contributory negligence as a matter of law in Illinois. In this profoundly
reasoned case, the only testimony for the plaintiffs was their own
and that of another interested person. The defendants presented
testimony by disinterested witnesses in addition to testimony by
their employees. Even with testimony on both sides of the case,
the Illinois Supreme Court still held the question to be one of law.
The court said:
[VIerdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only
in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its
aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors
movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever
stand. 61

Since Pedrick, three other Illinois cases(" have found contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In Keen v. Davis63 the Illinois Supreme Court considered a
case in which an administrator sued the drivers and owners of
two trucks to recover damages for wrongful death. The decedent
was travelling on an unpaved road, and the defendants were approaching her from the opposite direction. The first defendant
was pulling a drilling rig weighing many tons, which raised a
heavy cloud of dust around him and the decedent too, when their
vehicles passed by each other. A collision resulted between the
automobile driven by the decedent and the truck driven by the
second defendant. The second defendant was about four hundred
feet to the rear of the drilling rig. At the trial, it was shown that
at the time of the collision, each vehicle was approximately an
equal distance from its edge of the road. The Illinois Supreme
Court quoted and applied the Pedrick test:
"[V]erdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only
59328 Ill. App. 564, 570, 66 N.E.2d 443, 445 (1946), quoting from
otpech v. Continental 1ll. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 316 Ill. App. 482, 45
N.E.2d 530(1942). Accord, Kelly v. Chicago City R.R., 283 111. 640, 119
N.E. 622 (1918), laying down the Lotspiech test, later followed in Zoloth.
In Kelly, the plaintiff was struck by the rear or overhanging portion of a
streetcar when the streetcar rounded the curve. Despite the breadth of the
test, the Kelly court found that the contributory negligence question was
one for the jury.
60 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
6 Id. at 510 229 N.E.2d at 513-14.
62 Keen v. Davis, 88 Ill. 2d 280, 230 N.E.2d 859 (1967), Coselman v.
Schleifer, 97 Ill. App. 2d 123, 239 N.E.2d 687 (1968), and McInturff v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d 657 (1968).
63 38 Ill. 2d 280, 230 N.E.2d 859 (1967).
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in those cases in which all the evidence, when viewed in its aspects
most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant
that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand."
Applying the rule to the facts' of this case, we are of the
opinion that the trial court properly directed the verdict as to all
defendants. Under this state of facts plaintiff could never establish
6
..that his intestate was free from contributory negligence. 4

In Mclnturff v. Chicago Title & Trust

Co.,6 5 the First Dis-

trict Appellate Court reversed the trial court, which had held
that the contributory negligence question was for the jury.
Mclnturff was a wrongful death action for damages allegedly
caused by the defendant's negligent maintenance of a flight of
stairs that lacked a handrail. On the question of contributory
negligence, the court said:
Under the circumstances of this case - the absence of any
direct positive evidence that the defendants' negligence was the
proximate cause of the decedent's injury; the dubious probative
value of Dr. Okunieff's testimony relative to the decedent being a
careful man; and the weakness of the plaintiff's proof that the
decedent was in the exercise of ordinary care at and immediately
prior to the injury which caused his death - we believe that it
may fairly be said, that all of the evidence viewed most favorably
to the plaintiff, so overwhelmingly favors the defendants that no
contrary verdict based on this evidence could ever stand. Consequently, the defendant's motion for a directed6 6verdict at the close
of all the evidence should have been allowed.
Both of these rulings are directly and emphatically against
the former weight of authority of Illinois cases involving similar
fact situations. 7
Particularly striking is the contrast of the
pre-Pedrick case of Carter v. Winter68 with Keen v. Davis,69
which followed the Pedrick rule.70 It is very difficult to reconcile
the jury question ruling of Winter with the matter of law hold-

ing in the Keen case. Under the much more detailed, confusing,
and complicated facts of Keen, including the obstruction of the

plaintiff's view, the contributory negligence question would almost certainly have to be for the jury under the Winter precedent. On the other hand, under the Keen (Pedrick) rule, there
seems to be only slight doubt that the contributory negligence
Id. at 283-84, 230 N.E.2d at 861-62.
102 Ill. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d 657 (1968).
66 Id. at 50, 243 N.E.2d at 663.
67 See Thomas v. Buchanan, 357 Ill.
270, 192 N.E. 215 (1934) ; Carter v.
Winter, 50 Ill. App. 2d 467, 200 N.E.2d 528 (1964), aff'd 32 Ill. 2d 275, 204
N.E.2d 755 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Lubin v. Goldblatt
Bros., Inc., 37 Ill.
App. 2d 437, 186 N.E.2d 64 (1962); Bracher v. Illinois
Terminal R.R., 5 Ill. App. 2d 375, 125 N.E.2d 687 (1955); Holsman v.
Darling State St. Corp., 6 Ill. App. 2d 517 128 N.E.2d 581 (1955) ; Peterson
v. Hendrickson, 335 Ill. App. 223, 81 N.E.2d 266 (1948); Savaiano v. The
12th St. Store, 330 Ill. App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 744 (1947).
68 50 Ill.
App. 2d 467, 200 N.E.2d 528 (1964), aff'd, 32 Ill. 2d 275, 204
N.E.2d 755 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 825 (1965).
69 38 Ill.
2d 280, 230 N.E.2a 859 (1967).
70 See text at note 4 supra.
64
65
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question involved would be decided as a matter of law against the
plaintiff. The impact of Pedrick is unmistakable.
The pre-Pedrick "stair and incline" cases are almost unanimous in ruling the contributory negligence question to be one for
the jury.71 So, the facts in the post-Pedrick case of Mclnturff v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co.,72 particularly the absence of a handrail
would indicate that the contributory negligence issue would be
one for the jury, but in that case, the ruling was made as a matHere again, unmistakably, Pedrick has compelled
ter of law.7
the different result.
CONCLUSION
It seems inevitable that application of the Pedrick test will
lead to more rulings of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. After protesting that the test it laid down will not increase
the frequency of rulings as a matter of law, 1 the Pedrick court
went on to say:
[I]n any event, the current delay at the trial level is of greater
social concern than are our appellate caseloads. And since it is
well settled that trial courts may constitutionally direct verdicts,
governing such action can scarcely
minor variations in the rules
5
render it unconstitutional.
Clearly, Coselman v. Schleifer is an example of the court's
entry into questions which have in the past been issues to be
fully tried before a jury. After holding the concepts of assumed
risk and contributory negligence to be separate and distinct concepts, the court, in imputing to the plaintiff sufficient knowledge
of the danger involved, ruled that she assumed the risk, choosing
to follow the line of Illinois authority more lenient in allowing
such rulings as a matter of law. Then, in ruling contributory
negligence as a matter of law, Coselman showed in bold relief the
increased latitude of trial courts to direct verdicts and make rulings as a matter of law.
In light of the Pedrick progeny, as exemplified by Coselman,
it is highly problematical if the Pedrick court's characterization
of its new test as a "minor" variation in the test for holding
contributory negligence as a matter of law", is accurate. The
"no evidence" test 7 is clearly no longer the law in Illinois. SimiSee note 36 supra.
72102 Ill. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d 657 (1968).
Id.
7' The court said: "That a substantial increase in the proportion of
directed verdicts or judgments n.o.v. will be a necessary result seems highly
71

questionable .

.

."

37 Ill.
2d 494, 511, 229 N.E.2d 504, 514 (1967).

5 Id. at 511, 229 N.E.2d at 514.

76See text at note 75 supra.
7

See text at note 41 supra.
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larly, the "all reasonable minds would agree" test"' is also inoperative both as to the extent it was a substitute for the "no
evidence" test and in those situations where it displayed its own
independent viability. The trial court can no longer merely look
to see if there is little or no evidence in the plaintiff's favor
before ruling contributory negligence as a matter of law. Today,
under the Pedrick test,7 9 the trial court must weigh the evidence,
if only on a preliminary basis. In Melnturff v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co.,80 the First District Appellate Court said:
[T]he crucial question was whether it was error for the trial court
to overrule the defendants' motion for a directed verdict. They
[plaintiff's cited cases] are pre-Pedrick cases, and thereunder, a
motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict presented the single question of whether there was any evidence in the record, which standing alone and taken with its intendment most favorable to the party resisting the motion, tended
to prove the material elements of such party's case.
This rule was superseded by the Pedrick rule which provides
that a motion for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be entered only in those cases in which
all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the
opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary
verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.81
The Coselman court inferred from the plaintiff's knowledge
of the condition of the stairs and her own testimony that "...
she could or should have seen the rug had she been attentive."8
Under the Pedrick test, courts are able to draw such inferences.
The impact of Pedrick might be summarized as follows:
(1) Directed verdicts will become more frequent; (2) Judgments n.o.v. will become more frequent; (3) There will be more
rulings as a matter of law, not only of negligence and contributory negligence, but in other areas as well. While a case such
as Coselman simply could not have existed under any of the
pre-Pedrick"I tests, it is a logical application of the Pedrick test
to a given set of facts. Whatever the intentions or expectations
of the Pedrick court, the effect of its test is already unmistakable.
David Carlson

7 See text at note 50 supra.

78 See text at note 4 supra.

80 102 111. App. 2d 39, 243 N.E.2d 657 (1968) (Supplement to Opinion
on Denial of Petition for Rehearing).
8l Id. at 54, 243 N.E.2d at 664-65.
1297 Ill. App. 2d 123, 129, 239 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1968).
'3 See text at notes 41, 50 and 54 supra.

